Design, Development and Certification of the Boeing 737 Max Aircraft - Complete Investigatory Report on All Aspects of Safety Failures Leading to Two Fatal Airplane Crashes, Grossly Insufficient Overs E-BOOK

Professionally converted for accurate flowing-text e-book format reproduction, this unique book reproduces the definitive Congressional and government report dealing with the tragic Boeing 737 MAX aircraft accident controversy. Contents include: 1. Introduction * 2. Executive Summary * 3. Boeing History and 737 MAX Background * 4. FAA Oversight and Delegation of Authority * 5. Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System * 6. AOA Disagree Alert * 7. Boeing 737 MAX Pilot Training * 8. Production Pressure * 9. Post-Accident Response * 10. New Issues Emerge * 11. Final Observations * Interview of Ali Bahrami * Interview of Keith Leverkuhn * Interview of Michael Teal

The House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's final report on the Boeing 737 MAX lays out the serious flaws and missteps in the design, development, and certification of the aircraft, which entered commercial service in 2017 before suffering two deadly crashes within five months of each other that killed a total of 346 people, including eight Americans.
The Committee's 238-page report, which points to repeated and serious failures by both The Boeing Company (Boeing) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), contains five central themes and includes more than six dozen investigative findings. These themes include: Production pressures that jeopardized the safety of the flying public. There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and the 737 MAX program to compete with Airbus' new A320neo aircraft. Among other things, this pressure resulted in extensive efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX program schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production line. * Faulty Design and Performance Assumptions. Boeing made fundamentally faulty assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 MAX, most notably with MCAS, the software designed to automatically push the airplane's nose down in certain conditions. Boeing also expected that pilots, who were largely unaware that MCAS existed, would be able to mitigate any potential malfunction. * Culture of Concealment. Boeing withheld crucial information from the FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots, including internal test data that revealed it took a Boeing test pilot more than 10 seconds to diagnose and respond to uncommanded MCAS activation in a flight simulator, a condition the pilot described as "catastrophic." Federal guidelines assume pilots will respond to this condition within four seconds. * Conflicted Representation. The FAA's current oversight structure with respect to Boeing creates inherent conflicts of interest that have jeopardized the safety of the flying public. The report documents multiple instances in which Boeing employees who have been authorized to perform work on behalf of the FAA failed to alert the FAA to potential safety and/or certification issues.