Standaard Boekhandel gebruikt cookies en gelijkaardige technologieën om de website goed te laten werken en je een betere surfervaring te bezorgen.
Hieronder kan je kiezen welke cookies je wilt inschakelen:
Technische en functionele cookies
Deze cookies zijn essentieel om de website goed te laten functioneren, en laten je toe om bijvoorbeeld in te loggen. Je kan deze cookies niet uitschakelen.
Analytische cookies
Deze cookies verzamelen anonieme informatie over het gebruik van onze website. Op die manier kunnen we de website beter afstemmen op de behoeften van de gebruikers.
Marketingcookies
Deze cookies delen je gedrag op onze website met externe partijen, zodat je relevantere communicatie op onze eigen website en relevantere advertenties van Standaard Boekhandel op externe platformen te zien krijgt.
Je kan maximaal 250 producten tegelijk aan je winkelmandje toevoegen. Verwijdere enkele producten uit je winkelmandje, of splits je bestelling op in meerdere bestellingen.
Wellington's private memorandum on Napoleon's 1812 campaign reveals a relentless, damning critique of his strategic failures.
The Duke of Wellington had a great reluctance to write a history of any of his campaigns and battles, famously comparing them to the 'history of a ball' and discouraging several attempts to publish such works. By 1825, however, the Duke of Wellington was ready to contradict all these points.
Despite a busy schedule, bouts of illness and an immense correspondence, he began to research Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. He purchased books on the campaign almost immediately after they were published and studied them at length. Using this research, he wrote a memorandum on the campaign.
The resulting work ran to more than 25,000 words and served to demonstrate his true opinion on Napoleon. It was, from start to finish, a relentless blistering attack on Napoleon and his ability; every choice was questioned by Wellington and used to show Napoleon as incompetent and unimaginative. He wrote at length on the battles at Smolensk and Borodino, and he never failed to pin all the blame solely upon Napoleon.
Far from viewing him as a man worth forty-thousand men, he instead decided to attack every decision Napoleon made and to present his own alternatives. As he wrote, Wellington must have felt satisfaction as he criticised his old opponent.
He decided not to publish his writing, and only circulated it with a small group of friends, and, therefore, this work is far less known than his other stated views. Wellington had no desire to become embroiled in a public debate over Napoleon's ability and legacy, he would be content to praise him in public and keep his real views to himself for his own private satisfaction. This book seeks to finally make these views public once more, and to explore how Wellington reached the conclusions he did; from praising Napoleon to damning him.