Iraq and the Age of Intervention: The Middle East in History, is my attempt to make sense of how a single country kept drifting from one war into the next—and why outside powers kept stepping in. I start at the Shatt al‑Arab, that contested waterway where borders, currents, and national pride conspire to make conflict almost inevitable. From there the story moves into the bitter, personal rivalry between Saddam Hussein and Ayatollah Khomeini. Their confrontation did more than ignite the Iran–Iraq War; it reordered the region, invited arms dealers and foreign money, and turned Iraq into a frontline of modern intervention.

As the narrative unfolds I trace the war across its many stages: the sweeping air campaigns, the shadow of Osirak—the French‑built research reactor near Baghdad that Israel struck in 1981—and the political ruptures from the collapse of the 1975 Algiers Agreement to the wave of preemptive strikes like Operation Opera. I follow the fighting from Basra's devastated streets to the grim brutality of the Anfal campaign against the Kurds. These were not abstract maneuvers on a map. They were choices made by named leaders, advisers, and intermediaries—decisions whose long shadows fell on millions. Saddam's war machine, Iran's revolutionary zeal, and the quiet, often lucrative role of weapons suppliers all pushed the conflict toward exhaustion rather than resolution.

When the guns finally slowed, Iraq lay wounded but still dangerous. Oil, debt and raw ambition had collided, and Saddam was ready to make his next gamble. I trace the story from Rumaila — the vast oilfield astride the Iraq–Kuwait boundary that fed grievances and accusations — to the fraught meeting with Ambassador April Glaspie, and the chain of misread signals and diplomatic ambiguities that opened the door to Desert Shield. From Dick Cheney's calculations about force and deterrence to the palpable fears in Riyadh, from George H. W. Bush and Margaret Thatcher to UN Resolution 678, the Gulf War begins to read less like an accident and more like the result of a long accumulation of choices. Patriots and Scuds, the Highway of Death, and a battlefield victory that left more questions than answers all belong to this same moment.

That unfinished victory matters because it did not merely end a war — it set the conditions for what came next. I follow the road that runs from September 11 to Osama bin Laden, from the rise of al‑Qaeda to the Taliban's role as a sanctuary. The book connects those dots deliberately and, where necessary, cautiously: the wars of the 1980s and 1990s reshaped networks, grievances and state capacity, and the people making decisions often carried old assumptions into a new, more dangerous world.

In the final chapters, figures such as Donald Rumsfeld, Cofer Black, Ahmad Chalabi, Dick Cheney, and President George W. Bush step fully into the light. From the first major military response after 9/11—the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001—through President Bush's March 2003 ultimatum and the subsequent collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, intervention shifts from a reluctant option into a recurring instinct.

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