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Reform success and reform delay are subject to a variety of explanations. In general, high decisiveness leads to reform propensity, while its absence, or high resoluteness, to policy-gridlock. The Brazilian reform experience is contradicting: both aspects are present - factors leading to decisiveness as well as those inducing gridlock and reform delay. Leaving the static point of view and accounting for a dynamic development, this apparent contradiction gets resolved: in fact, the executive gained growing leeway during the 1990s, providing it with the means to achieve a higher degree of decisiveness of the political system by simultaneously guaranteeing resoluteness.It is, however, greatly mistaken to consider this development as a blank cheque to universal, encompassing reforming in all areas. Despite growing executive dominance and growing policy consensus, some particular reforms were a success, while others did not surpass its initial stages. This is finally due to path-dependency and explicit policy-specificities, triggering different institutional constraints and veto-points, which even strong Presidents cannot override.